Impacts of Alternative Policies Regulating Dockage by Wilson, William W. et al.
Agricultural Economics  Report No.  285
IMPACTS  OF ALTERNATIVE
POLICIES REGULATING DOCKAGE
William W. Wilson,  D. Scherping,
D. Johnson, and  D. Cobia
Department of Agricultural Economics
Agricultural Experiment  Station
North Dakota State University
Fargo, ND  58105
May 1992Acknowledgments
This research was financed  by the Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS)
through Cooperative Agreement #58-3AEK-0-800094,  entitled "Economics of Alternative
Regulations  on Wheat Cleaning in Hard Red Spring, Durum, and White Wheat," between
the Economic Research  Service  (ERS), U.S. Department of Agriculture and the North
Dakota Agricultural  Experiment Station.Table of Contents
Page
List of Tables  ....................................................  ii
List of Appendix Tables  .............................................  iii
List of Figures  ....................................................  iv
H ighlights  .......................................................  v
Previous Studies  ..................................................  2
Review  of Supporting Studies  on Wheat Cleanliness  ........................  4
Wheat Cleaning Costs and Grain Merchandising  ......................  4
Dockage Levels  in the U.S. Marketing System  ......................  4
Handling and Merchandising Practices  ............................  5
Cleaning Costs Estimated  by Elevator Managers  ....................  6
Economic-Engineering  Cost Estimates  ...........................  7
Benefits of Cleaning  .........................................  8
Wheat Cleaning Decisions at Country Elevators  .......................  . 10
M odel Features  .............................................  . 10
Simulations  Conducted For 1987 and  1990 Crop Years  ...............  11
Factors Impacting Cleaning Decisions  ...........................  11
Commercial  Discounts  .......................................  . 11
Change in Grade Standards  ...................................  12
Measuring Impact of Dockage  on Foreign Demand  for U.S. Wheat  .........  22
M odel Features  .............................................  13
Assum ptions  ...............................................  13
Simulation  Results  .........................................  13
R  esults  ...................................................  14
Value of Cleaner Wheat and Importer Isocost Lines  .................  14
Optimal Location  of Cleaning  ..................................  17
Lim itations  ................................................  17
Issues Related to Wheat Cleanliness and Import Demand  ...................  17
Comparing United States and Canadian Wheat  ....................  18
Other Observations  ..........................................  19
Impediments  to Contractual  Specifications  ........................  21
Market Segments  and the Demand for Wheat Cleanliness  ............  22
Competitor Response  ........................................  24
Aggregate Analysis of Benefits and Costs  ...............................  27
Conclusions  and Discussion  ..........................................  32
References  .......................................................  35
Appendix A  ............................................. 37List of Tables
No.  Pag
1  Percent of Elevators That Own and Operate  Grain Cleaners  for
Wheat,  1991  ...............................................  5
2  Cleaning Costs and Percentage  Cleaned by Country Elevators  in
North Dakota, and  Dockage Levels of the HRS Crop,  1984-1990  .......  6
3  Estimated Wheat-Cleaning  Costs for a Country and an Export
Elevator, Rotary Screen Cleaners Cleaning From 3% Initial
Dockage to 0.4% Ending Dockage,  1991  ..........................  8
4  Quality Attributes and Import Costs Used  in Simulations  ............  14
5  Cleaning Costs, Ocean Freight, and Tariffs Used  in Simulations  .......  15
6  Summary of Simulation Results  ................................  16
7  Mean Values of Selected  Grade Factor Characteristics  of Wheat at
Different Points in the Market  System  ...........................  .18
8  Correlation  of Selected  Grade Factor Characteristics  With Dockage  .....  19
9  Dockage  Contract Specifications  for Principal  Buyers of HRS,  1991  .....  20
10  Parameter Values Used  to Derive Net Cleaning Cost  ................  29
11  U.S. Production  and Export Volumes  (Million Bushels)  ..............  29
12  Benefits  and Costs of Cleaning HRS and Durum Wheat in  1987 to 0.7%
(Base Case) and Additional Benefits  and Costs of Cleaning to 0.5%
(Case  1) and  Only Exported Wheat to 0.5%  (Case 2) .................  29
13  Benefits and Costs of Cleaning HRS and Durum Wheat in  1990 to 0.7%
(Base Case) and Additional Benefits  and Costs of Cleaning to 0.5%
(Case 1) and  Only Exported  Wheat to 0.5% (Case 2) .................  30
14  Benefits  and Costs of Cleaning HRS and Durum Wheat in  1987 to 0.7%
(Base Case) and Additional Benefits  and Costs of Cleaning to 0.2%
(Case 1) and Only Exported Wheat to 0.2% (Case 2)  .................  31
15  Benefits  and Costs of Cleaning HRS and Durum Wheat in  1990 to 0.7%
(Base Case) and Additional Benefits  and Costs of Cleaning to 0.2%
(Case 1) and Only Exported Wheat to 0.2% (Case 2)  .................  31
16  Benefits and Costs of Cleaning White Wheat  in 1990  ................  32
iiList of Appendix Tables
No.  Par
A.1  Benefits  and  Costs of Cleaning HRS and Durum Wheat in  1987 to 1.0%
(Base Case) and Additional Benefits  and Costs of Cleaning to 0.5%
(Case  1) and  Only Exported Wheat to 0.5% (Case 2)  .................  39
A.2  Benefits and Costs of Cleaning HRS and Durum Wheat  in  1990 From
Production  Dockage Level  (Base Case) and Additional Benefits and
Costs of Cleaning to 0.5% (Case 1) and Only Exported Wheat to 0.5%
(Case 2)  ..................................................  39
A.3  Benefits and Costs of Cleaning HRS and Durum Wheat in  1987 to  1.0%
(Base Case) and Additional Benefits and Costs of Cleaning to 0.2%
(Case 1)  and Only Exported Wheat to 0.2% (Case 2) .................  40
A.4  Benefits and Costs of Cleaning HRS and Durum Wheat in  1990 From
Production  Dockage Levels  (Base Case) and Additional Benefits and
Costs of Cleaning to 0.2% (Case 1) and Only Exported Wheat to 0.2%
(Case 2)  ..................................................  40
A.5  Benefits and Costs of Cleaning White Wheat in  1990  ................  41
iiiList of Figures
No.  Page
1  Dockage Levels at the Farm and Country Elevator Level  for Durum
and  HRS W  heat  ............................................  5
2  Wheat Cleaning Costs at Export and Country Elevators,  1991 and
1990, Respectively  ..........................................  7
3  Effects  of Equipment Utilization Rate on Cleaning Costs for Cleaner A,
With Beginning and Ending Dockage Levels  of 3% and 0.7%,
Respectively,  1991  ..........................................  9
4  Effects  of Wheat Loss on Cleaning Costs for Cleaner A, With Beginning
and Ending Dockage Levels of 3% and 0.7%, Respectively,  1991  ........  9
5  Cleaning Margins With Specified Screening Values, Beginning Dockage
Levels,  and a Cleaning and Transportation Cost of $.05/bu  and $.60/bu,
Respectively  ...............................................  10
6  Trade-Off Between  U.S. Price and Dockage, Thailand  ...............  15
7  Trade-Off Between U.S.  Price and Dockage,  Turkey  .................  16
8  Segmenting International Wheat Market Demand for Wheat
Cleanliness  ................................................  23
9  Competitive  Positioning and Wheat Cleanliness  ....................  26
ivHighlights
In the U.S. marketing system, dockage in wheat is a nongrade-determining  factor.
Other countries include the equivalent of dockage as a grade-determining  factor with
stringent limits. Similar  proposals have been made in the United States.  Specifically, the
1990 Farm Bill enables the Federal Grain  Inspection Service (FGIS) to establish or amend
grade standards  to match levels of "cleanliness"  offered by competing countries. This study
evaluates economic impacts of alternative  means of regulating dockage levels in the U.S.
grain  marketing system for hard red spring (HRS), durum, and white wheat.  This report
summarizes results from three related studies, and draws aggregate conclusions and
implications.
Spring wheat is currently being cleaned to an average ending dockage level between
0.7% and 1.0%.  A regulation which required the entire spring wheat production to be
cleaned to an ending dockage level of 0.5% instead of 0.7% would incur the additional  cost
of $1.7 million and $4.9 million for HRS in  1987 and 1990, respectively.  The same
regulation  with respect to durum would incur the additional  cost of $0.6 million and $1.1
million in 1987 and 1990, respectively.  These cost increase as wheat is cleaned to lower
dockage levels.  A regulation  which required  the ending dockage level for the entire spring
wheat production  be 0.2% instead of 0.7% would incur the addition cost of $4.7 million
and $11.7 millon for HRS in 1987 and 1990, respectively.  The additional  cost of cleaning
durum is $2.2 million and $2.6 million in 1987 and 1990, respectively.
These costs are  probably not as large as for other classes since spring  planted wheat
is already cleaned and equipment capital costs would not be incurred. The relevant costs
are truly those of cleaning further  from current levels to which wheat is already cleaned.
Benefits, which are easily quantifiable, include transport  savings and the sale of
screenings. For a number of reasons, uniformly reducing the dockage level is not expected
to increase exports of U.S. wheat. Most important is that competitors likely would respond
to this type of policy with reduced  prices, thereby nullifying the intended effect of the policy.
In contrast to competitor countries, the U.S. system depends on negotiations between
buyers and sellers on individual transactions  to determine contractual  specifications that
jointly meet their needs.  In the case of dockage, this is the process in  which the optimal
level of cleanliness should be determined. However, in practice, the fact that in many cases
buyers are not  end-users precludes this system from working as intended.
An important  impact of the policy is on interchangeability  of wheat lots.  The
current  policy allows exporters flexibility of trading a large number of grade specifications
to meet the needs of different end-users.  While this  provides buyers with greater  specificity,
it also potentially results is fewer competitors capable of supplying highly specific contract
terms for every tender.  One impact of particular  importance in making dockage a uniform
and restrictive  grade factor would be to facilitate interchangeability  of lots across traders  to
intensify competitive bidding.
vAnother indirect impact of regulating  dockage levels that require more intensive
cleaning would be an overall improvement in quality.  Foreign  buyers, in discussing the
higher levels of dockage in U.S. shipments concurrently describe the incidence of higher
percentages of shrunken and broken kernels as well as other undesirable  factors.  These
were confirmed in simple correlation  analysis in this report. Significant and  positive
correlations were found between many of the grade-determining  factors and the level of
wheat dockage.  Thus, removing dockage also can improve the overall quality of wheat
before export.  This motive could be viewed as a component of a longer term strategy, which
would have the impact of improving the reputation  of U.S. wheat beyond simply the level of
cleanliness which is reported in this study.
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The impact of quality on competition  in the world wheat trade has been a subject
of growing interest.  While this is true for all exporting countries, wheat quality has been
of particular interest in the United States because of its reduced market share during the
1980s.  Much of this debate has been focused specifically on one characteristic--wheat
cleanliness.
In the U.S. marketing system, dockage in wheat is a nongrade-determining  factor.
In individual  transactions, the level of dockage is a contract term which is subject to
negotiation between buyers and sellers.  Other countries include the equivalent of dockage
as a grade-determining factor with stringent limits.  The configuration  of grade limits in
conjunction with intergrade price differentials provides incentives  to clean wheat in these
countries.  Similar proposals have been made in the United States.  Specifically, the  1990
Farm Bill enables the Federal Grain Inspection Service  (FGIS) to establish or amend
grade standards to match levels of "cleanliness" offered  by competing countries.
The  1990 farm bill included the "Grain Quality Incentive Act of 1990," which
mandated that the Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS) estimate benefits and costs of
cleaning grains  and the distribution of economic  impacts.  FGIS initiated a major study on
this topic before  making changes  in grade standards with respect  to dockage.  The FGIS,
through  a cooperative  agreement between the Economic Research  Service (ERS) and
selected land-grant  universities, is studying the economic impacts  of alternative means  of
regulating dockage levels in the U.S. grain marketing system for all major grains and
oilseeds.  North Dakota  State University (NDSU) is studying hard red spring (HRS),
durum, and white wheat and barley.  Adam and Anderson report similar findings  for hard
red winter and soft red winter wheat.
Four reports were prepared analyzing different aspects of the wheat cleanliness
problem. 2  This is the fourth report.  The other three reports analyze micro-economic
determinants  of cleaning decisions.  The first publication, Wheat Cleaning Costs and
Grain Merchandising, identifies dockage  levels and cleaning costs at various locations  in
the marketing system.  Characteristics  of country and export elevators are presented,  and
current merchandising practices are described.  The second publication, Wheat Cleaning
Decisions at Country Elevators, analyzes cleaning and blending at country elevators.  The
third publication,  Measuring the Impacts  of Dockage on Foreign Demand for U.S. Wheat,
develops  a model that can be used to evaluate the impact of dockage  on import demand
for U.S. wheat and to identify the optimal export strategy for individual foreign markets.
This report summarizes these studies, presents estimates of aggregate costs  of
alternative  regulations, and discusses  issues pertaining to the policy decision.  However,
first, we review previous studies which have addressed broader policy issues.
'Authors are professor, research assistant, assistant professor, and professor at North
Dakota State University, Fargo.
2These studies are available  from the authors.2
Previous Studies3
The Food Security Act of 1985 mandated  the Office of Technology  Assessment
(OTA) to study technologies,  institutions, and  policies that affect the quality of U.S.
exports and to examine the grain marketing system of major export competitors with an
emphasis on quality.  Two reports  were published  from this study: Enhancing the Quality
of U.S. Grain for International  Trade and Grain Quality in International  Trade: A
Comparison of Major U.S. Competitors.
The first report examined the U.S. marketing system and some possible changes to
enhance grain quality.  A major contribution of that study was to establish that issues of
quality go beyond grain standards.  Within this grain quality system, there are important
interrelationships  among 1) variety development,  2) production,  3) harvesting, 4) storing,
5) handling, and 6) testing.  Any discussion of policy options related to grain quality has
to encompass  all these factors.
Though the OTA study did not specifically address issues pertaining to wheat
cleanliness  or dockage,  it did set forth three areas where policy options could  improve U.S.
grain quality:  variety control, market intervention,  and grain standards.  Of particular
importance  is that of premiums and discounts, which are established  in the U.S. market
system through negotiation between buyers and sellers  for measurable  characteristics,
provide an important function.  Specifically,
Efficient determination  of price differentials  is important because they
essentially allocate grain across end-users and provide signals throughout
the production and marketing system (p. 5).
It is through these premiums and discounts that the market responds and the optimal
level of quality characteristics  are provided.  The OTA study also recognized the
importance and difference between "grade-determining factors" and "nongrade-
determining factors."  Dockage is an example of the latter.  Measuring a characteristic
allows it to become specified in a contract.  This facilitates  development  of premiums and
discounts which provide incentives  to produce the level of a characteristic,  in this case
dockage, desired by market participants.
The OTA study also included  a survey of domestic and overseas buyers on issues
related to wheat quality.  Important  points from that survey regarding wheat cleanliness
included  1)  Overseas buyers indicated  the level of dockage  was of greater importance than
did  domestic millers; 2) Overseas buyers ranked the level of dockage to be of lesser
importance than all other grade-determining  factors, except for contrasting classes and
wheat of other classes; and 3)  Overseas buyers were concerned  over the lack of uniformity
in U.S. wheat quality, with dockage being particularly important.
The second report provided detailed explanations  about the operations of grain
marketing systems in competitor countries with particular emphasis on quality.  Specific
3This section  only discusses  previous studies related to the broader policy issues
pertaining to dockage.  Other studies related to firm level economics  of cleaning are
discussed  in Scherping et. al.3
regulations related to dockage and incentive mechanisms  that exist in Canada and
Australia result in cleaner wheat than that exported from the United States.  Most
important is that a combination  of regulations implied in grade factor limits and
intergrade price differentials  through the operations of their respective price support
mechanisms yield incentives for removal  of dockage within the market system.  It  is a
combination of implied regulations  and incentives  which result in intensive cleaning of
wheat before export.
The Secretary of Agriculture was required by the United States Grain Standards
Act Amendments of 1988 to examine the effects of including dockage along with foreign
material (FM) as a grade-determining  factor.  The Economic Research  Service (ERS) and
FGIS conducted  a study to examine impacts  of combining dockage and FM either as a
grade-determining factor or as a weight-deductible  discount.  Results of this study were
published in a report entitled: Economic Implications of Combining Dockage and Foreign
Material in the Grading Standards  for Wheat  (Mercier et al.).
The study was conducted  for the crop years 1984/85 and 1987/88 to determine the
cost of combining dockage and FM as a single grade-determining factor.  Wheat export
shipments  for which the combined dockage and  FM exceeded  1.0 percent were regraded.
Price  differentials prevalent during the study (February 1989) were used  to calculate  the
cost of lowering the numerical grade.  Costs of combining dockage and FM as one grade-
determining factor were $6.87 million and $7.79  million for HRS,  $4.42 million and $3.59
million  for durum, and $2.85 million and $1.32 million for white wheat for crop years
1984/85  and 1987/87,  respectively.4
Combining dockage and FM as  a single discount factor was conducted two ways:
The first was to discount when the combined  level of dockage and FM exceeded  1.0
percent.  Discounts that were prevalent in the fall of 1988 were used to calculate  costs.
Costs of combining the two factors as a single discount factor were $3.89 million and
$4.75 million for HRS, $5.21 million and $4.57 million for durum, and $1.93 million and
$0.88 million for white wheat for crop years  1984/85 and 1987/87, respectively.
The second was by weight deduction.  The weight of dockage  and FM was deducted
when it exceeded  1.0 percent, while levels  lower than 1.0 percent were not deducted.  The
weight deduction was valued at the prevailing price for U.S. #2 export  wheat (June 1988).
The cost of combining the two factors and deducting by weight when the combined  factors
exceeded  1.0 percent was  $2.72 million and $1.84  million for HRS,  $2.96 million and $1.89
million for durum, and $0.80 million and $0.21 million  for white wheat for crop years
1984/85 and  1987/87, respectively.
The ERS study stated that cleaning could  reduce some of these costs.  The study
concluded that the cost  of combining dockage and FM as a grade-determining factor would
be between 0.1 to 0.6 percent of the annual value of export sales.
4An important fundamental  assumption of the methodology used in this study is that
historical shipment data, that result from trading practices and regulations at the time,
were regraded  "as-if' merchandisers were operating under the proposed regulations.  In
other words, the implicit assumption is that market participants' behavior would be
unchanged  under the new regulatory regime.4
Review of Supporting Studies on Wheat Cleanliness
As part of the overall project on wheat cleanliness, the NDSU Department of
Agricultural Economics  completed three separate studies, addressing specific topics
related to the broader issue of wheat cleanliness.  This section provides  a summary of
important points developed  in those studies.
The first study described  merchandising and cleaning practices  in spring planted
wheats.  This study analyzed survey data on the costs of cleaning wheat and
merchandising practices.  In addition, an economic-engineering  analysis of wheat cleaning
was conducted.
Optimization models were developed  in the other two studies to analyze potential
impacts of alternative policies  on market participants.  Of particular importance was that
proposed changes  in the treatment of dockage in grain standards  could  fundamentally
alter operating practices  of market participants.  Thus, use of historical data would be
inappropriate  to analyze these impacts.  Rather,  these models were developed  to simulate
market participants' likely responses to changes in their operating environment.
Wheat Cleaning Costs and Grain Merchandising
Dockage  levels at various  locations in the marketing system, merchandising
practices  that influence dockage  levels, economic-engineering  cleaning cost estimates, and
cleaning costs at country and export elevators  for durum, HRS, and white wheat are
presented  in Scherping et al.  Below are highlights  from the report.
1.  Dockage Levels in the U.S. Marketing System.  Dockage levels  reflect production
and climatic factors unique to a particular region.  HRS and durum, spring seeded wheat
which are grown in the same geographical region,  typically have higher dockage  levels
than fall seeded wheat, like white wheat.  In addition, dockage  levels in spring-seeded
wheat show great variation from year to year.  The following points highlight dockage
levels at various locations  in the marketing system:
*  Farm level  average dockage levels  for HRS and durum in the main production
region have ranged from 0.8% to 2.3%  and from 0.8% to 4.2%, respectively,
from  1984 to 1990  (Figure 1).
*Average  dockage  levels from country elevators  for HRS and durum was
roughly  1.0% from  1986 to 1990  (Figure 1).
*  Amount of dockage country elevators removed in the HRS and durum
production  region can be approximated by the difference between the average
farm and country elevator dockage levels  (Figure 1).
*  Average  dockage levels  in exported wheat were less than nonexported U.S.  #1
and #2  HRS, durum, and white wheat.  Exported U.S. #3  HRS and white
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FIGURE 1  Dockage levels at the farm and country elevator level for durum and HRS wheat.
1.  Regional:  Samples obtained from farms or deliveries at country elevators
-farm level.
2. FGIS: Submitted samples  shortly after local harvest -country elevator level.
SOURCE:  Department of Cereal Science and Food Technology and
U.S. Department of Agriculture, FGIS.  1986-1990 U.S. Wheat Crop Quality.
2.  Handling and Merchandising Practices.  Handling and merchandising practices
differ for elevators located in different  regions because economic  incentives vary across the
marketing system.
Elevators  in the HRS and durum production region generally own and operate
grain cleaners.  However, elevators located  in the white wheat production
region generally do not own and operate grain cleaners  (Table 1).
TABLE  1.  PERCENT  OF  ELEVATORS  THAT  OWN  AND
OPERATE  GRAIN  CLEANERS  FOR  WHEAT,  1991
Operate Grain  Durum & HRS  White Wheat
Cleaner  Elevators  Elevators
Yes  89.6  14.9
No  10.4  85.1
%  %  ---  ,Regional-Durum 1
%  %  Regional-HRS
#  _
VI-  -- ·-- ·-- ·--
4M.  . . . . . . . ./
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FGIS-HRS 2
I  ,  I  -I,,  I  I  ,  I1I6
*  Majority of export elevators  do not own and operate cleaners  capable of
cleaning wheat.
*  Country elevators in the HRS and durum production  region clean a substantia'
proportion of the wheat handled  (Table 2).
TABLE  2.  CLEANING  COSTS  AND  PERCENTAGE  CLEANED  BY
COUNTRY  ELEVATORS  IN  NORTH  DAKOTA,  AND  DOCKAGE
LEVELS  OF  THE  HRS  CROP,  1984-1990
Cleaning  Wheat  Dockage  Level  for  HRS
Year  Cost  Cleaned  North  Dakota  Regiona
¢/bu  %  - %---
1990  4.4  70  1.0  0.8
1989  4.6  82  1.0  0.9
1988  4.0  85  2.2  1.7
1987  3.5  99  2.7  2.3
1986  4.0  95  2.0  2.1
1985  4.2  98  0.9  0.9
1984  3.5  100  0.9  1.0
"Regional area  includes  Minnesota,  Montana,  North
Dakota,  and  South  Dakota.
SOURCE:  North  Dakota  State  University  and  Department
of  Cereal  Science  and  Food  Technology.
*  Country elevators in both the HRS and durum and white wheat production
regions typically buy wheat on a weight deductible  basis.
*  Country elevators  generally do not pass dockage discounts  back to the
producer.
*  Domestic transactions beyond the country elevator sometimes have a
"nonmilling discount"  for dockage besides  the weight deduction.
*  Export elevators, especially  those located at the Pacific Northwest,  use
discounts to discourage  deliveries of wheat with high dockage  levels.  These
discounts have come in response  to some importers'  stringent dockage limits.
3.  Cleaning Costs Estimated by Elevator Managers.  Country elevators in the HRS
and durum production  region and export elevators  were surveyed about cleaning costs:
*  Cleaning costs  for country elevators were fairly stable through time and the
amount of wheat cleaned represented  over 70% of production (Table 2).
*  Cleaning costs for both export elevators and elevators located in the HRS and
durum production region increase as the wheat is cleaned to lower dockage
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FIGURE 2  Wheat cleaning costs at export and country elevators, 1991
and 1990, respectively.
SOURCE:  Scherping et al.
4.  Economic-Engineering  Cost Estimates.  Economic-engineering  cost estimates were
derived for country and export elevators. These cost estimates were used to illustrate how
different components  affect cleaning costs.
S Components of cleaning cost for a country and an export elevator are
illustrated in Table 3.  Average  fixed costs are higher for country elevators
because of high investment costs relative to cleaning capacity.  A country
elevator's variable costs are lower for several reasons.  First, the value of
wheat loss is generally less at country elevators than at export elevators
because the wheat value is usually lower and the screenings value is greater.
Second, labor costs  were lower at country elevators.
*  Grain cleaner ownership involves high fixed costs relative to variable costs.
An elevator that matches  its cleaning capacity closely to its cleaning
requirements will incur lower average fixed  costs, e.g., depreciation and
opportunity costs.  Thus, higher utilization rates  will decrease  total average
cleaning costs (Figure 3).
*  Wheat loss is an important component  of the cleaning cost.  Specifically,  it
reflects the difference between the wheat value and screenings value.
Cleaning costs are directly related to the amount of wheat lost during cleaning
(Figure 4).
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TABLE  3.  ESTIMATED  WHEAT-CLEANING  COSTS  FOR  A  COUNTRY  AND  AN
EXPORT  ELEVATOR,  ROTARY  SCREEN  CLEANERS  CLEANING  FROM  3%
INITIAL  DOCKAGE  TO  0.4% ENDING  DOCKAGE,  1991
Elevatora
Country  Export
Item  Annual  €/bu  Annual  C/bu
Bushels  cleanedb  700,000  4,200,000
Fixed  costs:
Depreciation
Cleaner  2,984  0.4  7,026  0.2
Install  2,984  0.4  7,026  0.2
Opportunity
Cleaner  4,968  0.7  11,698  0.3
Install  4,968  0.7  11,698  0.3
TOTAL  FIXED  COSTS  15,904  2.3c  37,448  0 .9d
Variable  costs:
Wheat  lossd  6,644  0.95  95,785  2.3
Energy  955  0.13  1,836  0.04
Labor  1,079  0.15  61,250  1.5
Maintenance  350  0.05  700  0.02
TOTAL  VARIABLE  COSTS  9,028  1.3c  159,571  3.8c
TOTAL  COSTS  24,932  3.6  197,019  4.7
"These  cleaning  costs  refer  to  Cleaners  C  and  E  for  the
country  and  export  elevators,  respectively,  as  defined  in
Scherping  et  al.
bCleaning  for  700  hours  per  year.
"Numbers  do  not  add  up  because  of  rounding.
dAssuming  0.7% wheat  loss  and  price  differences  between  value
of  screenings  and  wheat  are  2.260/lb  and  5.430/lb  for  country
and  export  elevators,  respectively.
SOURCE:  Scherping  et  al.
5.  Benefits of Cleaning.  Elevators  clean when it is economically  profitable for them to
do so.  Benefits of cleaning include revenue  from sale of screenings, transport savings,
premiums gained/discounts  avoided,  increased storage capacity, increased aeration and
drying efficiency, and reduced insect and mold problems.  Only revenue  from sale of
screenings and transport savings were incorporated  in this analysis because other benefits
are not easily quantifiable.
*  Revenue  from sale of screenings and transport savings are combined with








Effects of equipment utilization rate on cleaning costs for Cleaner A, with
beginning and ending dockage levels of 3% and 0.7%, respectively, 1991.
Scherping et al.
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FIGURE 4  Effects of wheat loss on cleaning costs for Cleaner A, with beginning
and ending dockage levels of 3% and 0.7%, respectively, 1991.
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FIGURE 5  Cleaning margins with specified screening values, beginning dockage
levels, and a cleaning and transportation cost of $.05/bu and $.60/bu,
respectively.
SOURCE:  Scherping et al.
Cleaning margins are positively related to screening values, initial dockage
levels, and transport rates.
Wheat Cleaning Decisions at Country Elevators
An optimization  model to analyze cleaning decisions at country elevators  is
presented in Johnson et al.  The analysis places cleaning activities within the broader
framework of a blending and handling problem.  The model incorporates  detailed
functional  relationships  to derive cleaning costs.  With few modifications  the model could
be used in practice as a decision aid for cleaning, blending, and handling.  By
incorporating alternatives to cleaning, i.e., blending from different bins and shipping
wheat without cleaning, the model provides a pragmatic basis for assessing the impact of
selected variables  and for evaluating how alternative regulations  would affect the
economics  of cleaning.
1.  Model Features.  Wheat cleaning activities add complexity to a blending and
handling problem.  Unlike other wheat quality attributes, which can be altered only
r11
through blending activities,  the dockage levels in each bin can be controlled  independently
through cleaning operations.  The elevator sells wheat on a dockage-deductible  basis, that
is, the sales price applies  to weight net of dockage.  Since freight charges  are based  on
gross weight including dockage,  the elevator realizes savings on freight costs by cleaning
before shipment.  In addition, material removed through cleaning operations  (screenings)
can be sold as animal  feed.  The sum of freight savings and screening values less the
cleaning costs represents an implicit "cleaning margin," which may be positive or
negative.  Positive implicit cleaning margins  provide incentives  to remove dockage  from
wheat before shipment.
2.  Simulations  Conducted For 1987 and  1990 Crop Years.  The model represents  a
typical country elevator handling situation in North Dakota.  Factors affecting cleaning
and blending decisions are highly variable.  Since prices and quality attributes of wheat
available  for blending vary over time, framing a "typical" cleaning/blending problem is
inherently difficult.  Our approach was to perform simulations  with two different sets of
parameters, corresponding to two different crop years,  1987 and  1990.  Average dockage
levels were high in 1987, and the screenings value was low, whereas the opposite was true
in  1990.  Simulation results for 1987 and 1990 illustrate the sensitivity of the model to
these key parameters.
3.  Factors Impacting Cleaning Decisions.  The model is solved  with different values of
two key parameters--the  screenings  value and transport cost.  These values influence
incentives  to clean directly.  However, the extent of cleaning may shift from year to year,
depending on overall  dockage  levels.
The screenings price has a pronounced impact on cleaning activity  for both years.
For screening prices below $15  to $20 per ton, the implicit cleaning margin apparently
was negative:  cleaning did not occur.  Market and quality conditions of 1990 were such
that a higher price for screenings  was necessary to induce cleaning.  This can be
attributed to differences  in throughput rates,5 and higher levels of shrunken and broken
kernels (which affect wheat loss).
Transport costs  also affect cleaning margins.  Higher costs  induce more cleaning
because  of greater implied savings on freight.  The combination  of these two factors--
transport costs and screenings value impact cleaning profitability.
4.  Commercial Discounts.  Contract premiums or discounts for wheat cleanliness  also
influence the incentive to clean.  Premiums  for cleaner wheat or discounts  for lots with
dockage exceeding a particular level, though not pervasive  in current trading practices,
may be used to induce more  cleaning.
When a dockage  discount is specified, the seller must analyze whether it is more
profitable to accept the discount and avoid cleaning costs, or to avoid the discount by
cleaning to satisfy the contract  limit.  The answer depends  on the magnitude  of the
discount, the maximum dockage  limit, dockage  levels of the wheat in the bins, and
blending possibilities.
5When beginning dockage  levels are low, producing a given volume of screenings
entails cleaning a larger volume of wheat.12
Simulations indicated that the discount level necessary to induce cleaning would
have been larger under quality conditions  of 1987, due to higher average levels of dockage
and low screening values.  Under  1990 quality conditions, discounts were required only to
induce cleaning below 0.4 percent dockage.
5.  Change in Grade Standards.  The model was used to simulate impacts of proposed
changes  in dockage  limits (Grades #1,  #2, and #3 have 0.5% dockage; and Grades #4 and
#5  have 2.5% dockage) on a merchandising  firm.  The proposed change  in grade standards
would have affected  the extent of cleaning activity in 1987.  Under existing grade
standards and base-case  assumptions, the elevator had little incentive to clean.
Introducing a dockage  limit induces cleaning.  Under new grade standards, the extent of
cleaning in 1987 depended on the size of the price premium for Grade #3--a larger
premium induces more cleaning.  In contrast,  the change  in grade standards did not affect
cleaning in 1990.
Thus, the proposed change  in standards would have a significant  impact only in
1987.  Additional costs, of 0.7 cents per bushel (averaged over all bushels sold), would be
incurred in  1987 so that all wheat could meet or exceed the Grade #3  limits.  These are
net costs,  taking into account the value of wheat loss due to cleaning, returns  from sale of
screenings,  and transport savings.  Assuming no change in sale prices, the net costs of
satisfying new grade limits would be reflected  in compressed  margins or (more likely)
passed along to producers  as lower elevator bid prices.
Measuring Impact of Dockage  on Foreign Demand for U.S. Wheat
One of the perplexing issues concerning dockage regulations  is their potential
impact  on import demand  for U.S. wheat.  For numerous reasons,  historical data cannot
provide much insight into this question.  Similarly, most casual surveys would not yield
convincing results.  As an alternative, we developed a model that could be used to answer
a number of questions  related to the impacts of wheat cleanliness  on import demand  for
U.S.  wheat (Johnson and Wilson).
Wheat cleaning is viewed as a processing activity which can occur at any number
of points within the marketing system.  Thus,  cleaning activities within the exporting
country must be competitive with cleaning in the importing country.  At issue is the
optimal location for cleaning, considering differentials  in cleaning costs and screening
values in the export and importing country and transport and handling costs.
The model  developed in the study provides  a framework which can be used to
answer the following questions:  1) How do dockage levels affect demand for U.S. wheat,
and how does this vary across countries?;  2) What is the "optimal" dockage  level before
export?; and 3) Where in the U.S. marketing system is it optimal to clean wheat?
Although categorical answers for all these questions are not offered in the study, an
integrated framework  for analyzing decisions  of importers and merchandisers is provided,
and the impact of critical parameters on the value of cleaner wheat  is demonstrated.
Since factors impacting the value of cleaner wheat vary through time and, more
importantly, across countries, generalizing about the likely effects of lower dockage levels
on U.S. export market shares is difficult.13
1.  Model Features.  Specifically, we formulated  a cost-minimization problem  in which
an importer can buy wheat from the United States and/or from a competitor country.
Dockage  levels and other quality attributes  differ by country of origin; the importer can
purchase wheat from either or both sources, but wheat must be cleaned to a specified
level before milling.  Other quality constraints,  reflecting end-use  requirements,  also must
be satisfied.  The model highlights the significance  of quality and price differences  for
import purchase decisions and can be used to identify possible trade-offs between  price
and dockage.  Further, it provides an analytical basis for intercountry comparisons.
In addition to the importer's optimization  model, we  developed a second
optimization model  from the perspective  of a vertically integrated  U.S. export firm.  The
firm seeks to maximize net revenue from a sale by choosing (among other things) the
dockage  level in wheat offered for export.  The firm assembles  wheat at an interior
location and incurs  domestic transport charges  to an export facility.
Cleaning activities can occur at either or both locations; these are endogenously
determined based on relative cleaning costs, screenings value at different U.S. locations,
and transportation savings.  Quantities  exported are derived from the importer's  cost
minimization  problem.  The two models are solved jointly to determine the optimal
dockage  level contained  in export shipments.  This allows dockage to be viewed as an
instrument  of U.S. commercial  strategy.6
2.  Assumptions.  A number of specific assumptions  are critical  to this analysis:  1)
The importer minimizes  net costs, which are defined as wheat cost net of dockage  and
cleaning costs; 2) The exporter maximizes  profits; and 3) Competitor countries do not
respond to changes  in U.S. quality or prices.
3.  Simulation Results.  The  impact of reducing the dockage  level contained  in U.S.
wheat on market shares is reflected  in an importer's demand  for cleaner wheat.  This is
affected  by factors that can be quantified,  such as the price and dockage  level contained in
purchases  from the competitor country, the level of unmillable material  required before
milling, ocean shipping costs and tariffs, the cost of removing dockage,  and screening
values  in the importing country.
For illustration purposes, the importer model is solved  with two sets of parameters,
representing two countries.  Interviews with two foreign flour millers  (from Thailand and
Turkey) provided screening values, transport costs,  tariffs, and cleaning costs.  Attributes
of U.S. and Canadian  wheat used in the analysis are shown in Table 4, and specific
characteristics  for Thailand and Turkey are shown in Table 5.
Quality attributes of U.S. and Canadian wheat are similar.  Under these
circumstances,  the importer's requirements  for protein, test weight, and moisture can be
6  The model was developed to allow for additional quality characteristics and
constraints, which could be added.  However, data limitations precluded  us from
incorporating them in the analysis at this time.  To the extent the differences are
restrictive, the sensitivity of import demand  to price and dockage would decrease.14
TABLE 4.  QUALITY ATTRIBUTES AND IMPORT
COSTS USED IN  SIMULATIONS
Country
Item  Canada  U.S.
Protein  (%)  14.46  14.52
Dockage  (%)  0.24  *
Test weight  (lb/bu)  60.90  60.47
Moisture (%)  12.48  11.96
Price  ($/MT)
f.o.b. export port  125  *
*Determined endogenously.




Item  Thailand  Turkey
Handling cost  ($/MT)  0.2  2.5
Cost per hour  ($)  24.0  0.0
Rated capacity (MT/hour)  27.3  27.3
Wheat loss  factor  1.5  1.5
Price of screenings  ($/MT)  40.0  28.0
Ocean freight  ($/MT)
From United States  29.0  25.0
From Canada  29.0  25.0
Import duty ($/MT)  40.0  0.0
satisfied  from either source,  i.e., no constraints require blending U.S. and Canadian
wheat.  Thus, price and dockage are the critical determinants  of import decisions.
4.  Results of the analysis are summarized  in Table 6.  For Thailand, the optimal
solution (from the perspective of the U.S. export firm) would be to clean more intensively,
i.e., to 0.2 percent dockage  and match the Canadian price.  For Turkey, the U.S. should
accept a price discount (relative to Canada) and avoid  cleaning costs.  In this case, the
buyer would be unwilling to pay for cleaning wheat for a number of reasons, but
fundamentally  because it is not competitive  with cleaning domestically and local sale of
screenings.
5.  Value of Cleaner Wheat and Importer Isocost Lines.  This model can be used  to
quantify the trade-off, from an importer's perspective,  between price and incoming
dockage.  Importer isocost lines are shown  in Figures 6 and  7.  Each line is a locus of
points (U.S. price and dockage  level), representing equivalent value to the importer.
Movements  to the northeast are associated with higher costs to the importer, including
cleaning costs.  Curvature of the lines depends  on cleaning-cost parameters  and on
dockage  levels supplied by competing exporters.15
TABLE 6.  SUMMARY OF SIMULATION RESULTS
Thailand  Turkey
Optimal Strategic Variables
U.S.  export  price  ($/MT)  125.0  124.5
U.S. dockage  (%)  0.2  0.9
Objective Function Values
Importer's total cost  ($000)  19,526.3  15,254.2
Exporter's net revenue  ($000)  499.8  548.9
Imrorter  Isocost  Lines
VOV  V.  1  V.L  *  4.  V*  %F#%fV  V* r  V
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Figure  7  Trade-off  Between  U.S.  Price  and  Dockage,  Turkey
The isocost lines are steeper for Thailand than for Turkey.  This reflects
differences  in tariffs, ocean freight costs, and domestic screenings  value in the two
countries.  Moreover,  cleaning costs (exclusive of wheat loss) in Thailand are sensitive to
the level of incoming dockage, while those in Turkey are not.  Results indicate that in the
case of Thailand, buyers would be roughly indifferent  between buying wheat at 0.9%
dockage  for $124.00/MT  and .4% dockage for $124.65/MT.  Thus, the buyer could  pay a
premium  of up to 65€/MT  (1.8€/b)  for cleaner wheat and be equally well off.  However, in
the case of Turkey, the additional premium the buyer could pay for the reduced  dockage
level is only about $.30/MT.  Since the marginal costs of cleaning to this lower level
exceeds  this amount, the buyer would prefer the lower priced alternative  with slightly
greater dockage level.
Different optimal solutions exist, depending on the importing country's
characteristics.  The optimal solution (from the perspective of the U.S. export firm)  for
Thailand would be to match the competitor's price and clean more intensively.  For




relative to the competitor and to avoid cleaning.  With the quality requirements  of Turkey
and the relative costs and prices  in this case, selling wheat at a discount is more
profitable than cleaning before export.
6.  Optimal Location  of Cleaning.  The optimal location to clean wheat within the U.S.
market system, at least in the case of wheat grown in North Dakota, is at the country
elevator.  This is  due to the combined impacts of transport costs, differentials  in
screenings value, and cleaning costs.
7.  Limitations.  This analytical  framework has a number of important limitations.
First, the results are highly specific to particular countries.  A number of factors are
identified that affect demand for cleaner wheat, including screenings values, cleaning
costs, and requirements  before milling.  These vary substantially across countries.  Hence,
as a tool for "aggregative" analysis  (e.g.,  examining the global  impact of proposed  dockage
regulations), the framework would require  highly specific  information from a large
number of individual markets.
Second, the importer model is based on an objective of cost minimization  that
includes  cleaning costs before milling.  This  is acceptable  for countries where the importer
(buyer) and the end-user are the same.  However,  in numerous countries  (such as the
former USSR, China, Algeria,  and Mexico),  either the importing agency is  not an end-user
or end-users potentially have a limited influence on the specification  of quality limits.  In
these countries, the appropriate  objective may be to minimize gross import cost (i.e.,
excluding cleaning and sale of screenings).  These countries  would likely respond more to
international price differentials than to relative dockage levels and other quality
parameters.
Third, the analysis was conducted  on the assumption that competitor exporting
countries do  not respond.  This assumption implies that reducing the dockage  level in U.S.
wheat exports would  not precipitate a lower price from competitor countries  to retain
their market share.  Relaxing this assumption would result in no gains for the United
States, it would simply reduce costs  for the importer.
Issues Related to Wheat  Cleanliness and Import Demand
The study described in the previous  section illustrates microeconomic  determinants
of import decisions with respect to price and quality attributes.  Different  types of demand
behavior are due to end-use requirements,  price/quality differentials between  competing
exporting countries, and costs  of handling, transporting and cleaning, both in the
exporting and importing countries.  An integrated  framework  for analysis of cleaning
decisions at each stage of the marketing system is provided by Johnson and Wilson.
However, data requirements  for the model and, for that matter, any model that
attempts to analyze microeconomic decisions related to this problem, are highly specific.
Detailed  information is required minimally about quality requirements,  cleaning costs,
and screenings values in the importing country.  To be more realistic, detailed information
about these values from competitor countries,  in addition to transaction prices and other18
quality characteristics,  are required.'  We have discovered that these informational
requirements are excessive.  Thus,  our ability to draw global generalizations  ascribing
quantitative estimates of benefits attributable to increased exports from this model  is
limited.
This section provides  a discussion of issues surrounding the impact of reduced
dockage  levels on import demand  from a more aggregate perspective.  These observations
emanate  from the results and experiences  of developing the microeconomic  model
described earlier and from discussions with numerous importers  and traders about this
problem.
1.  Comparing United States and Canadian Wheat.  Differences  do  exist in grade
factors values for spring planted wheats between the United States and Canada in some
import markets, particularly in Japan and Taiwan.8  Averages  for dark northern spring
(DNS) and Canadian  western red spring (CWRS) are shown in Table  7.  Values  in North
Dakota for the same crop years used  in this study are compared  to values at the point of
import in these two markets, and  the correlation  coefficient between dockage  level and
other grade factors  (Table 8).  These results indicated a number of important
observations:
TABLE  7.  MEAN  VALUES  OF  SELECTED  GRADE  FACTOR  CHARACTERISTICS  OF
WHEAT  AT  DIFFERENT  POINTS  IN  THE  MARKET  SYSTEM
North  Dakota  Taiwan'  Japanb
HRS  HRS  DNS  CWRS  DNS  CWRS
1987  1990  14.5%  13.5%  14.0%  13.5%
Protein  14.18  14.24  14.36  13.98  14.03  14.07
Dockagec  1.72  0.95  0.68  0.18  0.85  0.14
Shrunken  & broken  1.02  1.18  1.76  1.68  1.39  0.95
Foreign  material  0.21  0.06  0.12  0.07  0.34  0.20
Damage  0.56  0.55  N/A  N/A  0.54  0.40
Defects  1.75  1.79  N/A  N/A  2.27  1.55
aShipments  from  1985  through  1990.
bShipments  from  1981  through  1991.
"Average dockage  level  is  not  weighted  by  volume.
SOURCE:  U.S.  Wheat  Associates  in  cooperation  with  the  buyers  in  these
respective  countries.
7See Wilson and Preszler for a discussion of the impacts  of end-use quality
characteristics  and requirements  and their distributions on'import demand  and exporter
competitiveness.
sThese data have been collected  by U.S. Wheat Associates and in cooperation  with the
buyers in these respective countries.19
TABLE  8.  CORRELATION  OF  SELECTED  GRADE  FACTOR  CHARACTERISTICS
WITH  DOCKAGE
North  Dakota  Taiwana  Japanb
HRS  HRS  DNS  CWRS  DNS  CWRS
1987  1990  14.5%  13.5%  14.0%  13.5%
Test  weight  -. 30*  -. 31*  -. 05  -. 36  -. 15*  -. 16*
Shrunken  & broken  +.23*  +.20*  +.36*  +.16  +.30*  +.24*
Foreign  material  +.26*  +.37*  +.19  -. 38  +.44*  +.05*
Damage  +.15*  +.21*  N/A  N/A  .00  +.03*
Defects  +.35*  +.32*  N/A  N/A  +.31*  +.29*
aShipments  from  1985  through  1990.
bShipments  from  1981  through  1991.
*Indicates  significant  at  the  10% level.
SOURCE:  U.S.  Wheat  Associates  in  cooperation  with  the  buyers  in
these  respective  countries.
*  The dockage  levels in North Dakota exceeds that in the import markets,
indicating the extent of cleaning that occurs.  However, the dockage level  in
DNS exceeds that for CWRS for both importing country.  The dockage  level in
DNS imports by Taiwan is less than that in Japan,  likely due to their
contractual  specification.
*  For other characteristics,  values  for CWRS are only slightly better than that of
the United States.
*  Correlation  coefficients between dockage and other grade factors are of
particular interest.  First, correlation coefficients  at different points in the
market system are fairly constant  for DNS.  Second,  correlation coefficients
between dockage  levels in DNS and other factors  are significant.  These suggest
that lower dockage  levels are correlated with lower amounts of shrunken and
broken kernels, foreign material, and defects.  Each of these are statistically
significant and important to end-users because of their impacts  on extraction
and mill efficiency.
*  Detailed examination  of this data  indicates that the dockage  levels contained  in
DNS has declined  through time.  Specifically, in Japan it declined from an
average  of about .90% during 1980-1984 to .73% and .61% in  1989 and 1990,
respectively.  The average  dockage level in DNS imports by Taiwan has
decreased  from .88% in 1985 to an average  of .65% during the period 1986 to
1990.
2.  Other Observations.  A number of important points need reiteration about the
United States and international market systems related to dockage:20
*  With few exceptions  (listed below) international wheat buyers can buy wheat
with highly specific and reduced  dockage levels from the United States.  Since
the change in procedures  for "rounding," which went into effect in  1987,9
buyers working with their suppliers can specify dockage  to the nearest  1/10% in
contracts.  In addition, they can specify limits and/or premiums and discounts
for deviations  from some designated quantity.
*  Examples  of some contractual  specifications  regarding dockage  are shown  in
Table 9.  Specifications  for dockage  in export contracts vary across countries.
Wheat is often purchased  on a "clean basis," that is, with dockage weight
deducted.  Some buyers  (e.g., the Philippines) deduct dockage above a specified
level.  Other buyers  (e.g., Taiwan) purchase  wheat on a clean basis but also
apply penalties for dockage above levels specified  in the sales contract.  Still
other countries make no specification at all for dockage,  implying that gross
weight  (including dockage)  is used for settlement.
TABLE  9.  DOCKAGE  CONTRACT  SPECIFICATIONS  FOR  PRINCIPAL  BUYERS  OF
HRS,  1991
Country/Agency  Dockage  Specifications
Algeria  all  dockage  deductible,  1.0% maximum
Columbia  all  dockage  deductible,  1.5% maximum
Japanese  Food  Agency  0.5% dockage  nondeductible
Korea  dockage  deductible
Taiwan  clean  basis  - dockage  all  deductible  plus
an  additional  penalty  for  all  dockage
based  off  contract  price
Philippines  0.5% dockage  nondeductible
Chinaa  0.1% dockage  nondeductible,  0.1% maximum;
excess  dockage  all  deductible
USSR  0.5% dockage  nondeductible,  no  maximum
PL480  tender  no  mention  of  dockage
aThis  specification  deducts  dockage  after  the  first  0.1%.
SOURCE:  U.S.  Wheat  Associates.
9Before this time, dockage was rounded  down when reported on certificates.
Consequently, dockage was always  underreported. Thus, implicit incentives  existed to
only clean or blend to the dockage limit, as opposed to the dockage that was reported.21
*  The market system provides  positive incentives to clean HRS and durum wheat,
independent of contractual  specifications.  In addition, grain-handling firms
have responded with expanded capacity to accommodate  additional  cleaning to
meet particular buyers' specifications before loading.
*  Survey results of domestic buyers indicate that regardless of the incoming
dockage  levels,  wheat is cleaned before milling.  Conversations  with overseas
buyers confirm that similar operating practices exist in their countries.  Thus,
wheat cleaning before export must be competitive with cleaning and resale of
screenings  in the importing country.  The question is  how intensive should
wheat be cleaned before export, recognizing that additional cleaning inevitably
will be conducted  within the importing country before milling.
3.  Impediments to Contractual  Specifications.  The philosophy behind the U.S.
grading system depends  on contractual specifications  for both grade and nongrade
determining factors  (e.g., dockage).  Negotiations  between buyers  and sellers  on individual
transactions  should result in contractual  specifications  that jointly meet their needs.  In
the case of dockage, this is the process  in which the optimal  level of cleanliness  should be
determined.  The optimal level likely would vary across importing countries as  well as
through time.  However,  in practice, a number of impediments may prevent this process
from working effectively:
*  Buyers are not always the end-user:  In many cases, individuals charged with
procurement responsibilities  for an importing country are not end-users.  This is
important since the end-user  (in this case, the miller) must determine the
optimal level of cleanliness.  In an unfettered market system, these values can
and are normally conveyed  as contract specifications.  However, if the end-user
is not the direct buyer and/or has  negligible impact on the buying process,
contract  specifications may not represent  those that would be optimal.  This is a
problem  in many countries  in which wheat is procured through government
buying agencies.  This problem is not limited to purely government procurement
agencies.  Situations  also exist in which the end-user is affiliated  in some way
with a trading firm whose responsibilities entail procurement.  If that trading
firm is not directly involved in grain handling and simply procures wheat
through competitive bidding, end-user  demands may not be reflected  in
contractual  specifications  and in the quality received.  The procurement firm
may try to exploit economies  of large-scale  purchases  of homogenous  wheat lots,
which may not be in the end-user's  interests.
*  Bidding Competition:  The U.S. grain marketing system depends  on bidding
competition  as a mechanism to allocate sales among and between grain
exporters.  This  is a basic tenet of the U.S. grain marketing system and
contrasts sharply with that of competitor countries, which have single-seller
agencies.  Competition among bidders  is directly related to the number of
bidders.'0  Contracts with less specificity generally attract a greater number of
bidders.  Thus, importers striving to increase the intensity of competitive
'0See Preszler, Wilson and Johnson  for a discussion of these points.22
bidding have a tendency  not to require specifications that would limit the
number of bidders.
Contracts with greater specificity, such as tighter dockage specifications,  result
in fewer eligible competitors in the bidding process.  This increased quality
specificity has the potential to decrease bidding competition  intensity.  Thus,
buyers  are forced  to assess a trade-off between the intensity of bidding
competition and contract specificity."
4.  Market Segments  and the Demand for Wheat Cleanliness.  Foreign buyers have
dissimilar demands for quality characteristics,  which is evident  from the diverse
specifications  in purchase contracts.  These differences are due to desired product
characteristics  in individual markets, levels of technological  and commercial
sophistication,  and local  competitive situations.  Of particular importance in the case of
dockage  is the domestic marginal cost of cleaning, screenings value or the cost of disposal
if appropriate,  products  produced,  processing technology and institutional procedures  for
importing.  If these vary across importing countries, the expected  "value of clean wheat"
to buyers  and their potential  response in terms of purchases, also will vary.  This makes
any sort of aggregate measure of benefits associated with increased exports highly
tenuous.
In countries  where  screenings are highly valued  as animal feed,  high dockage
levels  are more tolerable.  By purchasing wheat that has not been cleaned intensely, an
importer acquires  screenings  at the ocean freight cost plus domestic cleaning.  Other
countries (e.g., New Zealand  and Taiwan) impute large costs to dockage because  of
environmental safeguards  (i.e., avoidance  of seed contamination or dust from cleaning
operations) and corresponding high disposal costs.  In these countries, buyers are willing
to pay a greater premium  for cleaner wheat to avoid or minimize those costs that would
be associated with intensive cleaning within the country.
The world wheat market can be viewed as being comprised of market segments,
which can be used to describe demand for wheat cleanliness.  A market segment is a
group of buyers who respond similarly to the same stimulus.  In this case, buyers are
referred to as importing countries, though different segments  also may exist within a
country.  The stimulus  is  cleaned wheat.  These are delineated  in Figure  8.  Four bases
for segmenting the market are used to illustrate the differences.12
The first basis is  to distinguish by end-use,  in this case, between  feed and nonfeed
uses.  This is included  to acknowledge the feed component of the market likely would not
expand  purchases because of improved cleanliness.  The second basis separates the
"This  problem is further exacerbated  in administering some of the export programs
that depend on competitive bidding and release of information.  Heterogenous contract
specifications  are more difficult to administer because  of difficulty in assessing alternative
bids.
120Other bases could  be introduced, but they would unnecessarily complicate  the
analysis.  These include more specific products produced  (instead of the fairly gross
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Figure 8  Segmenting  International Wheat Market Demand for Wheat  Cleanliness
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market according to a competitive factor, in this case, to distinguish between those
markets in which there  is intervention  in the form of direct or indirect export subsidies.
The motivation for including this is that existing price and credit differences  in these
markets are sufficiently great that the impact of cleaner wheat likely would not expand
sales.' 3  In other words, these interventions  result in disparities, which may override a
buyers' calculation  of benefits of purchasing cleaned wheat.
The third basis for segmentation  is the purchasing organization.  Based on
discussion  in the previous section, it follows that only those countries in which end-users
are directly involved  in purchasing and determining contract specifications  (or have a
great deal of influence) would demand for wheat cleanliness be conveyed  in the form of
increased purchases.  In other countries, demand for wheat cleanliness  likely would not be
reflected  in purchase contracts and, therefore, impact purchase decisions.  The final factor
is the value of cleaned wheat, which was the focus  of the microeconomic model of wheat
purchase decisions.  As discussed in previous sections, this is determined by a number of
factors, which are potentially unique to each importing country.  Only in the case where
the net benefit of purchasing clean wheat is positive (B>0) would cleaner wheat increase
purchases.
The purpose  of this illustration is to identify segment(s) that likely would expand
purchases as a result of a U.S. policy requiring increased cleaning before export.  In the
context of this figure, segment  15 would be that which would most likely expand
purchases.  This segment is characterized  as nonfeed,  nonsubsidized markets in which
end-users are directly involved in purchase decisions and  in which the net benefit of
purchasing cleaned wheat (B>0) is  positive.  If consideration  is made for a period of time
during which EEP and other interventions are not important market features, then
segment  11 would converge  to be identical to segment  15,  resulting in greater specificity
on contract terms.  Additional sales to any other segments would be unlikely.
We are not capable at this time to identify potential  size of these market segments.
Thus, enumerating the proportion of the market that would be sensitive to reduced
dockage would be highly speculative.
5.  Competitor Response.  Another critical factor in assessing impacts of a change in
U.S.  policy toward wheat cleanliness  is the likely response  from existing competitors.  The
microeconomic  model of import demand assumes existing competitor countries  would have
no response.  However,  from a competitive  perspective,  reduced dockage  (or equivalently,
any improvement  in quality) should be interpreted as being equivalent to a price
reduction.  To the extent competitor countries  respond, any benefits associated  with
improved  exports resulting from this policy would be reduced.  Specifically, as the
probability of response by competitor countries  increases,  benefits attributable to
expanded  export sales decrease proportionately.  In the extreme case (though as discussed
below, very likely) where competitors respond simply by lowering prices, there would be
no benefit  in terms of expanded exports.
3 sOur microeconomic model demonstrates that buyers' demand for clean  wheat can
shift on small changes in relative prices.25
The likelihood  of competitor's  responding is discussed here qualitatively.  The
general thrust of the policy change  in the United States has been promoted  as a means of
matching a single quality characteristic  of competitors.  This is an attempt to change the
terms of competition.  In response  to reduced  dockage in shipments  from  the United
States and, therefore,  improved value in some market segments, competitor countries
would be forced to simply reduce price because 1) their cleaning costs  are truly marginal;
2) they have built longer term marketing programs  and sales strategies  around
cleanliness;  and 3) at least in the case of Australia,  one of the original motivations  for the
structure of their marketing system was for quality control.  Specifically,  improved
cleanliness  reduces  infestation which was a problem in the  1960s (Wilson and Orr).  The
long-term result would simply be no change in the U.S. market share and a lower net
purchase cost for importers.
This problem  can be viewed in the context of competitive positioning and is
illustrated in Figure 9, which shows the "ideal point" for different buyers, in this case, for
two product attributes:  wheat dockage and  price.  The  ideal point represents a discrete
reservation  concept between price  and dockage  level.  The figure shows two segments to
this market:  One segment,  S1 has a preference  for lower levels of dockage  and is willing
to pay a slightly higher price.  Buyers  in this segment  would purchase any combination  of
price and dockage to the "northeast" of the ideal point represented  by Si.  The second
segment, S2,  represents  a group of buyers, who would prefer a slightly lower price and
corresponding  slightly higher dockage  level.  Also shown are hypothetical current offerings
of two competitors,  Co and U0, representing the likely relative positions of some competitor
countries and the United States, respectively.
In this case, buyers in  S1  would buy from Co and buyers in  S2 would buy from U0.
It is crucial  that we  do not know the size of the market segments represented by the area
encircling  S1.  Neither do we know the extent that a premium  is received  for the provision
of cleaner wheat from the competitor country.  If S,  is too small relative to the supply
available from  Co, then the competitor is  forced  to sell to buyers  in S2 at a discount
relative  to the price received  from buyers  in Si.  This is represented  by the offering Co.
The effect  of the proposed  policy shift for the United States would be to shift its
offering to Uo, a point closer to the ideal point of buyers in market segment Si.  The effect
of this is to improve the United States position relative  to competitors, resulting in a more
secure position with respect to S2.  Whether this increases sales to  S1  depends on the price
for U.S. wheat, if the dockage level equals the ideal point, and how the competitor
responds.
One alternative  for the competitor's response  to the change  in U.S. offerings  would
be to simply match the terms and continue serving  S1 at a lower price.  Because of the
change in U.S.  policy, buyers  in S: would have greater bargaining power with respect to
the competitor.  The other alternative would be for the competitor to abandon its policy
and begin targeting S2 directly with high dockage  wheat at a lower price.  The latter
alternative  is highly unlikely.  The more likely alternative would be to simply match the
U.S.  offerings and continue to serve their targeted markets, offering their residual supply
to S2 at a discount.High
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Aggregate Analysis of Benefits and  Costs
This section provides  aggregate estimates of costs and benefits of proposed  policy
changes for three classes of wheat: HRS, durum, and white.  The methodology is described
and results are discussed.
Changes in grain grade standards with respect to dockage  will impact current
handling and merchandising practices.  The effects of any new regulation cannot be
predicted with certainty, and alternative regulations  would result in different
distributions of benefits and costs.  A number of policy approaches  can be implemented to
achieve the goal of cleaner wheat for export.
One proposal would incorporate  dockage as a grade-determining factor in the grade
standards for wheat.  This proposal  specifies U.S. grades #1,  #2, and #3 with a maximum
of 0.5% dockage  and grades  #4 and #5 with a dockage  limit of 2.5%.  Impetus for this
proposal is that, since  most importers specify U.S. #2 wheat, setting the dockage  limit at
0.5% would ensure that most importers receive wheat with low levels of dockage.' 4
Aggregate benefits and costs  of cleaning wheat to different dockage levels are
derived  for three cases.  Under the Base Case, we calculate  benefits and costs of cleaning
wheat to an ending dockage  level of 0.7%.  This is close to current cleaning practices for
country elevators in the durum and HRS wheat production region (where wheat is
generally cleaned  to an ending dockage level around  1%).  An ending dockage level of
0.7% in the Base Case was chosen instead of 1% because the average dockage for both
HRS  and durum was 0.8% in  1990, and a Base Case with an ending dockage  level of 0.7%
can be compared more easily across two years for which we have appropriate data.  We
derived similar estimation using 1.0% as the Base Case; these are shown in Appendix A
for reference.  The Base Case is compared  to two other cases in which wheat is restricted
to be cleaned to lower levels.
In Case 1, wheat is restricted to be cleaned at the point of first sale.  Thus, all
spring wheat produced would be cleaned at country elevators to meet the specified
dockage  limit.  In Case 1,  like the Base Case, the entire production of wheat is cleaned at
the country elevator.  In Case 2, only wheat that is  exported must meet the dockage  limit.
Wheat is either cleaned at the export elevator, or is bought cleaned,  i.e., country elevators
clean before shipment.  In the Base Case and Case  1, the entire production  is cleaned; in
Case 2, only that which  is exported is cleaned to these limits.  By comparing results from
the Base Case with those for the other two cases, we can derive the marginal benefits  and
costs to the marketing system of additional  cleaning requirements  implied in the proposed
policy.
Benefits  and costs of cleaning wheat in the three cases were derived from a
modification of the optimization model  developed in Johnson and Wilson.  Specifically, the
'4While the majority of DNS is purchased  in the international market as grade #2,  this
is less apparent in the case of durum.  In this market, a significant proportion of durum
sold from the United States  is sold as #3.  Of particular importance for the overall policy
is that if some buyers shift from purchasing #2  (or #3)  to the new lower grade, #4,  at a
reduced price, the more liberal allowances  for other factors  would reduce overall quality.28
exporter's maximization  problem is used, and restrictions are imposed on the model to
correspond with the Base Case, Case  1,  and Case 2.  Costs involved with cleaning include
machine cost  (grain cleaner operating cost) and the value of wheat loss.  Benefits include
revenue  from the sale of screenings and domestic transport savings  (if the wheat is
cleaned at the country elevator).' 5
A summary measure called a net cleaning cost is derived and reported on a per
bushel basis.  This  is defined as
Net Cleaning Cost = cleaning cost (machine cost)
+ value of wheat loss
- transport savings
- sale of screenings
A complete description of machine and transport cost and the wheat loss factor are
reported  in Johnson and Wilson.  The machine cost of removing a specific amount of
dockage  is not constant but depends on initial and ending dockage  levels.
Costs and benefits  of cleaning are impacted by the initial dockage level and the
value of wheat and screenings,  which vary from year to year and across wheat classes.
For the sake of consistency with previous reports, simulations  were conducted  for two
extreme years for durum and HRS  wheat; 1987 had high dockage levels  and low screening
values, and  1990 had the opposite.  Simulations for white wheat were conducted only for
the  1990 crop year.
Table  10 contains  values used in the simulations; dockage  levels, screening values,
and value of wheat at the country elevator are averages  for that particular year.  Value of
exported wheat is the county elevator's value of wheat plus handling and transport costs.
A handling cost of $7.34/MT represents  the handling cost at both the country and export
elevators.  Transport costs were $36.66/MT and  $12.66/MT  for country elevators  that
handled durum and HRS  and country elevators that handed white wheat, respectively.
Transport costs are from the country to an export elevator,  i.e.,  for spring wheat from
central North Dakota to an export elevator located  in the Pacific Northwest.
The actual amount of wheat cleaned varies among the three cases.  In the Base
Case and Case 1, the entire production  is cleaned to a specific dockage level.  In Case 2,
only wheat exported  is required to meet the proposed  policy's dockage level.  Production
and export volumes are presented in Table 11  for HRS, durum, and white wheat.  Total
net cleaning costs for the three cases were derived by taking the net cleaning cost on a
per bushel basis and multiplying by the appropriate volume of wheat.
The components  of benefits and costs of cleaning and net cleaning costs  for HRS
and durum wheat for 1987 and 1990 are shown in Tables  12 and  13, respectively  (Cases 1
and 2 cleaned to an ending dockage  level of 0.5%).
15 Other benefits  associated with cleaning are increased  storage capacity,  increased
aeration and drying efficiency, and reduced  insect and mold problems.  However, these
benefits are not easily quantifiable and likely would be relatively inconsequential.29
TABLE 10.  PARAMETER
COST
VALUES USED TO DERIVE NET CLEANING
Wheat
HRS  Durum  White
Item  1987  1990  1987  1990  1990
Dockage  levels  (%)  2.3a  0.8'  4.2a  0.8'  0 .8b
Screenings  ($/ton)  10"  300  10°  300  70b
Transport.  ($/MT)  36.7  36.7  36.7  36.7  12.5
Wheat  value  ($/MT)
Country  elevator  91"  82"  126c  90°  80a
Export  elevator  135  126  169  134  100
aDepartment  of  Cereal  Science  and  Food  Technology.
bScherping  et  al.
"North  Dakota  State University.
dUSDA/ERS.




HRS  Durum  White
Item  1987  1990  1987  1990  1990
Production  431  555  93  122  313
Exports  255  210  62  50  220
Source:  USDA/ERS.
TABLE  12.  BENEFITS AND COSTS
IN 1987  TO 0.7%  (BASE CASE)
COSTS OF CLEANING TO  0.5%  (
TO 0.5%  (CASE 2)
OF CLEANING HRS AND DURUM WHEAT
AND ADDITIONAL BENEFITS AND
CASE 1) AND ONLY EXPORTED WHEAT
Base Case  Case 1  Case 2
Benefits  and Costs  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum
-----------  million dollars ------------
Costs  (-)
Machine  15.5  4.6  2.2  0.6  1.3  0.4
Wheat loss  7.3  5.1  0.9  0.4  0.5  0.2
Benefits  (+)
Transport. savings  6.9  3.3  0.9  0.2  0.5  0.1
Sale of screenings  3.0  1.4  0.4  0.1  0.3  0.1
Net cleaning cost
(costs - benefits)  12.9  5.0  1.7a  0.6  1.0  0.4
"Numbers  do  not  add  up  because  of  rounding.30
TABLE  13.  BENEFITS  AND  COSTS  OF  CLEANING  HRS  AND  DURUM  WHEAT
IN  1990  TO  0.7% (BASE  CASE)  AND  ADDITIONAL  BENEFITS  AND
COSTS  OF  CLEANING  TO  0.5% (CASE  1)  AND  ONLY  EXPORTED  WHEAT
TO  0.5% (CASE  2)
Base  Case  Case  1  Case  2
Benefits  and  Costs  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum
--------  -- million  dollars  ------------
Costs  (-)
Machine  2.8  0.6  6.1  1.3  2.3  0.6
Wheat  loss  0.6  0.1  1.1  0.2  0.4  0.1
Benefits  (+)
Transport.  savings  0.6  0.1  1.1  0.2  0.4  0.1
Sale  of  screenings  0.6  0.1  1.7  0.4  0.6  0.2
Net  cleaning  cost
(costs  - benefits)  2.2  0.5  4.9a  1.li  1.91  0.4
"Numbers  do  not  add  up  because  of  rounding.
Net cleaning costs for HRS and durum was $12.9  million and $5.0 million,
respectively,  in  1987 in the Base Case  (Table 12).  The additional net cost (marginal cost)
of cleaning the entire production to an ending dockage level of 0.5% (Case  1) would be
$1.7  million and $0.6 million for HRS and durum, respectively,  in 1987  (Table 12).  Thus,
the net effect of a policy that requires wheat to be cleaned at point of first sale (Case 1)
would be $14.6  million  ($12.9 million  + $1.7  million) and $5.6 million ($5.0 million + $0.6
million) for HRS and durum, respectively.
The additional net costs (marginal cost) in Case 2 are $1.0 million and $0.4 million
for HRS and durum, respectively  (Table 12).  The additional net cleaning costs in Case 2
are less than those in Case 1 because  volume of wheat to be cleaned  is lower.
Net cleaning costs in the Base Case for 1990 (Table 13) are substantially less than
those for 1987 (Table 12),  even though production was greater in 1990.  This resulted
because  the net cleaning costs on a per bushel  basis were less in  1990 compared  to 1987.
Benefits and costs  of cleaning were smaller in 1990 because less dockage  was removed.
Tables  14 and  15 depict the three cases, except the ending dockage  level in Cases  1
and 2 is  0.2% instead of 0.5%.  This illustrates cleaning to an ending dockage  level similar
to competitor countries.  The Base Case is the same as the previous two tables; however,
the net cleaning costs in Cases  1  and 2 increase because the wheat is being cleaned to a
lower dockage level.
One striking difference between Tables  14 and 15 concerns the machine cost of
cleaning HRS wheat in Case 1.  In  1987 (Table 14), machine costs were $5.2 million
compared  to $15.5  million in  1990  (Table 15).  Initial dockage levels accounted  for this
differences.  In  1990, the beginning dockage  level for HRS was 0.8% compared to 4.2% in
1987; thus, machine costs in the Base Case were larger  in  1987 than 1990.  The marginal31
TABLE  14.  BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CLEANING HRS AND DURUM WHEAT
IN 1987 TO 0.7%  (BASE CASE) AND ADDITIONAL BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF CLEANING
TO 0.2%  (CASE 2)
TO 0.2%  (CASE 1) AND ONLY EXPORTED WHEAT
Base  Case  Case  1  Case  2
Benefits  and  Costs  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum
----------  million  dollars  ------------
Costs  (-)
Machine  15.5  4.6  5.2  2.0  3.1  1.4
Wheat  loss  7.3  5.1  2.6  0.9  1.5  0.6
Benefits  (+)
Transport.  savings  6.9  3.3  2.2  0.5  1.3  0.3
Sale  of  screenings  3.0  1.4  0.9  0.3  0.5  0.2
Net  cleaning  cost
(costs  - benefits)  12.9  5.0  4.7  2.2a  2.8  1.5
"Numbers  do  not  add  up  because  of  rounding.
TABLE  15.  BENEFITS  AND  COSTS  OF  CLEANING  HRS  AND  DURUM  WHEAT  IN
1990  TO  0.7% (BASE  CASE)  AND  ADDITIONAL  BENEFITS  AND  COSTS  OF
CLEANING  TO  0.2% (CASE  1)  AND  ONLY  EXPORTED  WHEAT  TO  0.2%
(CASE  2)
Base  Case  Case  1  Case  2
Benefits  and  Costs  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum
------------ million  dollars  -------------
Costs  (-)
Machine  2.8  0.6  15.5  3.4  5.9  1.4
Wheat  loss  0.6  0.1  2.8  0.6  1.0  0.2
Benefits  (+)
Transport.  savings  0.6  0.1  2.8  0.6  1.0  0.2
Sale  of  screenings  0.6  0.1  3.3  0.7  1.3  0.3
Net  cleaning  cost
(costs  - benefits)  2.2  0.5  11.7a  2.6a  4.4a  1.0f
"Numbers  do  not  add  up  because  of  rounding.
cost of cleaning from a dockage  level of 0.7% (Base Case) to 0.2% (Case  1) was larger in
1990 than for 1987.  However, the total machine cost is higher for 1987 than for 1990
when cleaning to an ending dockage  level of 0.2% because more dockage is being removed
in 1987.  In Case  1,  machine costs when cleaning to an ending dockage  level of 0.2% were32
$20.7 million ($15.5 million + $5.2 million) and $18.3  million ($2.8 million  + $15.5 million)
for 1987 and 1990, respectively.
Benefits and costs of cleaning white wheat and net cleaning costs are presented  in
Table 16.  White wheat is grown in the Pacific Northwest,  close to export  facilities.  In the
simulations, it was optimal  for wheat to be cleaned at the export elevator; thus,
transportation  savings were nil.
TABLE  16.  BENEFITS AND
1990
COSTS OF CLEANING WHITE WHEAT IN
Base  Case  Case
Benefits  and  Costs  Case  1  2  1  2
---  ending  dockage  level  (%)  ---
0.7  0.5  0.5  0.2  0.2
------ million dollars  ----------
Costs  (-)
Machine  0.9  1.5  1.1  4.4  3.1
Wheat  loss  0.6  1.6  1.1  3.8  2.6
Benefits  (+)
Transport.  savings  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Sale  of  screenings  1.2  2.5  1.8  6.0  4.2
Net  cleaning  cost
(costs  - benefits)  0.3  0.9a  0.7a  2.2  1.5
"Numbers  do  not  add  up  because  of  rounding.
Net cleaning costs are low compared to durum and HRS wheat.  The differences
largely reflected by white wheat's higher screenings value.  Screenings  value for white
wheat was $70/ton, which is relatively close to the wheat value.  If screenings  value were
lowered, then net cleaning costs would increase.
Conclusions and Discussion
Commercial treatment  of wheat dockage differs drastically across exporting
countries.  In Canada and Australia, regulations  ensure that only minimal dockage  levels
are contained  in exports, and these are uniform  for all importing countries.  In the United
States, dockage is not a grade-determining  factor and  competitive pressures serve as the
regulatory mechanism.  As such, the dockage  level contained in particular shipments  is
subject to negotiation between  individual buyers and sellers.  Consequently, the dockage
level varies across buyers and contracts,  and normally  an explicit or implicit premium  is
reflected in the value of shipments containing lower dockage  levels.  Dockage differs  from
other quality attributes because it can be controlled  (removed) at several points in the
marketing system, including the point of processing (i.e., the foreign mill), and the by-
product of the cleaning process can be sold.33
Changes have been proposed for U.S. grade standards to  reduce  dockage levels  to
enhance competitiveness  of U.S.  wheat in world markets.  In evaluating such proposals,
understanding how individual  firms discern cleaning decisions  is crucial.  This  report
provides a summary of a comprehensive  study on the impacts of incorporating dockage as
a grade-determining  factor.  Three previous reports discuss specific aspects of the problem
and analysis.'1
The first study (Scherping, Cobia,  Johnson, and Wilson) describes how dockage  is
managed throughout the merchandising system.  That report also derives  estimates of
costs of removing dockage at various points in the market system.  Spring planted wheats
are currently cleaned throughout the U.S. grain market system.  The frequency of wheat
cleaning of these classes  is somewhat unique compared  to others.  Nearly all country
elevators have cleaning equipment  and regularly clean.  Reasons  for more frequent
cleaning of these classes includes the level of incoming dockage  is greater and costs of
transport from  the production  region are higher.  Head-to-head  competition between these
classes and comparable  classes exported  from Canada also result in pressure to clean.
However, these classes could be cleaned more  intensively.
The second study (Johnson, Scherping, and Wilson) develops an analytical model of
cleaning decisions from the perspective of a typical country elevator in North Dakota.
Critical factors that have an impact on wheat cleaning decisions  are identified: cleaning
costs, screenings  value, and transport cost.  As these factors change,  the implicit margin
associated with cleaning changes, resulting in a change  in the optimal quantity cleaned.
Johnson and Wilson provide a microeconomic  model of wheat import decisions to
determine the trade-off between prices and dockage,  and to determine the optimal
strategy for a U.S. exporting firm.  Alternatives include selling wheat that has  not been
cleaned extensively at a discount or selling intensively  cleaned wheat and trying to recoup
cleaning costs through higher prices.  Intensive cleaning before export must be
competitive with the marginal cleaning costs  and sale of screenings at the importing
country.  The results illustrate that, in general,  countries  with low cleaning costs, high
domestic screenings  values, and low import tariffs  would prefer to buy wheat at a slightly
lower price and incur the cleaning costs domestically.  Other countries with high cleaning
costs, screening disposal  costs, import duties, or low screening values would be willing to
pay a premium to import wheat that has been cleaned  intensively before export.  Since
these factors vary drastically across importing countries, generalizing about the extent
that imports would increase as a result of regulated reductions  in wheat dockage  is nearly
impossible.
Proposed  regulations would  increase costs to the industry.  However, the costs are
not as large as  expected since these classes of wheat are already cleaned  and equipment
capital costs would not be incurred.  The relevant costs are truly those of cleaning further
from current levels to which wheat is already cleaned.  The benefits, which are easily
quantifiable,  include transport savings and the sale of screenings.  However  for these
classes,  the marginal costs exceed these benefits, and the difference  depends on the
characteristics  of the particular crop year.  For a number of reasons, uniformly reducing
'
6No intent is made here  to summarize each of these reports.  The body of this report
contains summary points from each of these individual studies.34
the dockage  level is not expected to increase  exports of U.S. wheat.  Most important is
that competitors  likely would respond to this type of policy with reduced prices, thereby
nullifying the intended effect of the policy.
A number of other considerations, which are not quantifiable,  are important in
evaluating this change in policy.  One is the impact of the policy on interchangeability  of
wheat lots.  The U.S. market system depends on bidding to determine the allocation of
exports and handling activities across firms.  The current policy allows exporters the
flexibility of trading a large number of grade specifications  to meet the needs of different
end-users.  While this provides buyers with greater specificity, it also potentially results  is
fewer competitors capable of supplying highly specific contract terms  for every tender.
One impact of particular importance in making dockage a uniform and restrictive grade
factor 7 would be to facilitate interchangeability  of lots across traders to intensify
competitive bidding.
Another indirect impact of regulating dockage levels that require more  intensive
cleaning would be an overall  improvement  in quality.  In discussing the higher levels of
dockage  in U.S. shipments, foreign buyers concurrently describe the incidence of higher
percentages  of shrunken and broken kernels as well as other undesirable factors.  These
were confirmed in simple correlation analysis  in this report.  Significant and positive
correlations were  found between many grade-determining  factors  and the dockage  level.
Thus, removing dockage before export also can improve the overall  wheat quality.  In the
context of the analyses reported  in this study, these undesirable factors are reported as
wheat loss, which increases  with intensive cleaning.  Fundamentally,  by not cleaning as
intensively, this potential  wheat loss  is implicilty sold for the price of wheat.  This motive
could be viewed as a component  of a longer term strategy, which would have the impact of
improving the reputation of U.S. wheat beyond simply the level of cleanliness  which is
reported  in this study.
'7The term restrictive is used here to describe a configuration  of factor limits that do
not allow for transactions  with marginally lower limits at lower prices.  Thus, all lots are
forced to be shipped at the same level.35
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TABLE A.1.  BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CLEANING HRS AND DURUM
WHEAT IN  1987 TO  1.0%  (BASE CASE) AND ADDITIONAL BENEFITS
AND COSTS OF CLEANING TO  0.5%  (CASE 1) AND ONLY EXPORTED
WHEAT TO 0.5%  (CASE 2)
Base Case  Case 1  Case 2
Benefits  and Costs  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum
-----------  million dollars ------------
Costs  (-)
Machine  12.9  3.9  4.7  1.3  2.8  0.9
Wheat  loss  6.0  4.6  2.2  0.8  1.3  0.6
Benefits  (+)
Transport. savings  5.6  3.0  2.2  0.5  1.3  0.3
Sale of  screenings  2.6  1.3  0.9  0.2  0.5  0.1
Net cleaning cost
(costs - benefits)  10.8a  4.2  3.9a  1.5'  2.3  1.0a
"Numbers  do not add up because of rounding.
TABLE A.2.  BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CLEANING HRS AND DURUM
WHEAT IN 1990 FROM PRODUCTION DOCKAGE LEVEL  (BASE CASE) AND
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CLEANING TO 0.5%  (CASE 1)
AND ONLY EXPORTED WHEAT TO 0.5%  (CASE 2)
Base Casea  Case 1  Case 2
Benefits and Costs  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum
----------  million dollars-----------
Costs  (-)
Machine  0.0  0.0  8.9  2.0  3.4  0.8
Wheat  loss  0.0  0.0  1.7  0.4  0.6  0.2
Benefits  (+)
Transport. savings  0.0  0.0  1.7  0.4  0.6  0.2
Sale of screenings  0.0  0.0  2.2  0.5  0.8  0.2
Net cleaning cost
(costs - benefits)  0.0  0.0  7 .2b  1 . 6b  2 . 7b  0.6
"Base  Case benefits and costs are not present since the average
beginning dockage level for both HRS and durum was  0.8%.




BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CLEANING HRS AND DURUM
1987  TO 1.0%  (BASE CASE) AND ADDITIONAL BENEFITS
OF CLEANING TO 0.2%  (CASE 1) AND ONLY EXPORTED
WHEAT TO 0.2%  (CASE 2)
Base Case  Case 1  Case 2
Benefits  and Costs  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum
--------- million dollars ------------
Costs  (-)
Machine  12.9  3.9  7.8  2.7  4.6  1.8
Wheat  loss  6.0  4.6  3.9  1.4  2.3  0.9
Benefits  (+)
Transport. savings  5.6  3.0  3.4  0.7  2.0  0.5
Sale of  screenings  2.6  1.3  1.3  0.4  0.8  0.2
Net cleaning cost
(costs - benefits)  10.8  4.2  6.9a  3.1a  4.1  2.0
aNumbers  do  not  add  up  because  of  rounding.
TABLE  A.4. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CLEANING HRS AND DURUM WHEAT
IN 1990 FROM PRODUCTION DOCKAGE LEVELS  (BASE CASE) AND
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CLEANING TO  0.2%  (CASE 1)
AND ONLY EXPORTED WHEAT TO 0.2%  (CASE 2)
Base Casea  Case 1  Case 2
Benefits and Costs  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum  HRS  Durum
----------  million dollars-----------
Costs  (-)
Machine  0.0  0.0  18.3  4.0  6.9  1.6
Wheat loss  0.0  0.0  3.3  0.7  1.3  0.3
Benefits  (+)
Transport. savings  0.0  0.0  3.3  0.7  1.3  0.3
Sale of  screenings  0.0  0.0  3.9  0.8  1.5  0.4
Net cleaning cost
(costs - benefits)  0.0  0.0  13.9b  3 .0b  5 . 2b  1.2
aBase Case benefits and costs are not present since the average
beginning dockage level for both HRS  and durum was  0.8%.
bNumbers do not add up because of  rounding.41
TABLE A.5.  BENEFITS AND
1990
COSTS OF CLEANING WHITE WHEAT IN
Base  Case  Case
Benefits  and  Costs  Case  1  2  1  2
--- ending  dockage  level  (%)  ---
0.7  0.5  0.5  0.2  0.2
-------- million  dollars--------
Costs  (-)
Machine  0.0  2.5  1.8  5.3  3.7
Wheat  loss  0.0  2.2  1.5  4.4  3.1
Benefits  (+)
Transport.  savings  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Sale  of  screenings  0.0  3.8  2.6  7.2  5.1
Net  cleaning  cost
(costs  - benefits)  0.0  1 .2b  0 .9b  2.5  1.8b
"Base  Case  benefits  and  costs  are  not  present  since  the
average  beginning  dockage  level  was  0.8%.
bNumbers  do  not  add  up  because  of  rounding.